Emmanuel Macron, in his visit to South Korea in early April 2026, brought back into the heart of the international strategic debate an idea he had already outlined at the Shangri-La Dialogue: the formation of a “coalition of independents,” as journalist Andrew Korybko willingly comments.
The stated objective is clear: to prevent the international system from structuring itself permanently around a Sino-American duopoly. The French president formulated it unambiguously: it is about not becoming “vassals of two hegemonic powers,” or depending on China, or exposing excessively to the fluctuations of American policy.
By rallying around this ambition actors such as South Korea, Japan, India, Brazil, Australia, Canada, and Europeans, Emmanuel Macron outlines the contours of a “third way.”
The implicit diagnosis posed by Paris is that of a world that could be described as “bi-multipolar”: two dominant superpowers – the United States and China – coexist with a plurality of regional or intermediary powers, without these being able to structure the global order on their own.
The French proposal specifically aims to go beyond this configuration to bring about a “tri-multipolar” system. In this scheme, a third force – not being an equivalent superpower – would exert a structuring influence on international balances.
This force would play an adjustment role: by positioning itself between Washington and Beijing, it would contribute to limiting their hegemonic capacity while attracting states eager to preserve their strategic autonomy. It would thus contribute to the emergence of a more complex international order, sometimes referred to as “multiplex.”
The idea of tri-multipolarity can be interpreted in several configurations.
The first is based on the emergence of a single pivot state, often envisioned in the form of a “civilization-state.” Some analysts believe that Russia could claim this role, or at least come close to it.
The second hypothesis rests on a structured alliance between great powers. The strategic partnership between Russia and India is sometimes mentioned as a possible basis for such a scenario.
Finally, the third configuration – the most realistic – would be that of a coordination platform between several intermediate or regional powers. Formats like BRICS are regularly cited as embryos of this dynamic.
It is within this last perspective that Emmanuel Macron’s proposal fits.
However, this approach is not without precedent. It is part of a trend observable in Indian foreign policy.
This approach corresponds to an operational form of tri-multipolarity. In this sense, the French initiative appears as an attempt to formalize and expand a model already implemented by New Delhi.
In this context, India occupies a singular position. By its demographic weight, economic growth, and strategic autonomy, it emerges as a central actor in the ongoing systemic transition.
Its inclusion in the “coalition of independents” is not trivial: it reflects Paris’s recognition of the structuring role that New Delhi is likely to play in the future international architecture.
This centrality is also recognized by other major powers. The economic rapprochement between the United States and India, as well as the strength of Russo-Indian relations, attest to this.
Ultimately, the French initiative highlights a central question of our time: how to exist in a world dominated by two major powers without being absorbed into their orbit?
If Emmanuel Macron’s answer deserves discussion, its implementation will depend less on declarations of intent than on the ability of the states involved to transform a convergence of interests into a real political project.
