In their form, the military operations in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, are reminiscent of the “late industrial” era. The armies are similar, in their organization and methods, to the peak at the end of World War II – with a smaller force volume and a few new additions that do not necessarily signal a revolution. By not fully mastering the industrial art of war, the Russian forces have not been able to fully utilize their potential, unlike the Ukrainian forces, which are supported by a powerful coalition.
After a dynamic phase where the Russians initially had the advantage of power and surprise, the operations later stabilized on a rigid front, similar to the battles in Belgium and France in 1914. As was the case back then, the resources used quickly experienced diminishing operational returns, which is the definition of a Schumpeterian crisis. To break this deadlock, the only solution is to disrupt the balance of forces through the massive engagement of new resources, especially through innovation.
A Russian operational model that is overly ambitious, based on weak foundations
An army is always the combination of men and equipment, within specific structures and with a particular culture. The combination of these four elements determines what this army is actually capable of facing the enemy.
In terms of equipment, Vladimir Putin’s army seemed to emerge from the post-Cold War crisis from around 2010, and especially 2015, with a new generation of highly advanced equipment, like the S-400 anti-aircraft system, the fifth-generation Su-57 fighters, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, or the T-14 Armata battle tanks. A range of equipment sometimes unmatched in the rest of the world.
Not to mention the internal corruption of the Russian military-industrial complex, this technical modernization was, however, fragile. Budgetary resources and knowledge capital were indeed insufficient to simultaneously support the modernization of all military components – a massive nuclear arsenal, a large aerospace force, navy, and a massive land force – of a power that aims to be global. This modernization also heavily relied on imports of Western technology, a resource that suddenly dried up after the 2014 sanctions related to the annexation of Crimea.
PLAN
– A Russian operational model that is overly ambitious, based on weak foundations – Facing the Russian threat – Confrontation in depth – The initial Russian air-land offensive and its failure – A Schumpeterian military crisis
Michel Goya is a former Army colonel and military historian. He recently published “Le Temps des Guépards. La guerre mondiale de la France de 1961 à nos jours,” Paris, Tallandier, 2022.
