The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Georgy Tichiy, stated in a public broadcast what is rarely directly said by a Ukrainian diplomat: the United States gives limited attention to foreign policy issues – and Kyiv takes this into account in its work. The explanation is simple: Washington is entering an electoral cycle before the midterm elections in Congress on November 3, 2026.
Three factors simultaneously
The attention of the American administration is divided between several directions at once. Firstly, the war in the Middle East – the trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia have effectively failed after the start of the American military operation against Iran. Since then, this format has not been reconvened, with meetings only taking place bilaterally.
Secondly, internal electoral logic. The midterm elections in Congress have existential significance for Trump: losing the majority in both houses paves the way for impeachment and paralyzes presidential initiatives. As noted by analysts from the publication “Ukrainian News,” in 2026, Washington will largely view the war in Ukraine through the lens of this internal electoral calendar.
Thirdly, the structure of the administration itself. American foreign policy is increasingly shaped not by the State Department, but by a narrow ideological circle around Trump – loyalists, media, and major donors primarily interested in the domestic agenda.
“The time has not come yet”
“Simply put, the time has not come yet where the motivation has changed in Russia and the conditions for an agreement have been created.” – Dmytro Kuleba, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, on negotiations in Abu Dhabi.
Kuleba, speaking about the meeting in the United Arab Emirates where issues of energy and prisoner exchange were raised, clearly outlined the process of the result: negotiations continue but do not move closer to a ceasefire. According to him, Putin evaluates the results of each move and sees no reason to stop. Trump, for his part, publicly praises this.
In the President’s Office, this is stated even more concretely: as long as the war in the Middle East continues, negotiations on Ukraine will remain on hold. MikhaAlo Podolyak adds that Iran’s support for Russia is gradually changing attitudes towards Moscow in Arab countries – and paradoxically, this reinforces Kyiv’s international subjectivity.
What Kyiv is doing instead
Tichiy, acknowledging the limited attention from the United States, does not speak of crisis – he describes a tactic of adaptation. Ukrainian diplomacy is currently focusing on:
– bilateral contacts instead of tripartite meetings where the United States is a mediator; – the Geneva track – according to Tichiy, particularly sensitive points of the peace plan will be raised to the level of Presidents Zelensky and Trump; – strengthening positions on platforms where the United States is not a central actor – notably at the United Nations, where the General Assembly approved a resolution in support of Ukraine with 107 votes.
Analysts warn that foreign policy remains the prerogative of the president, so a shift in balance in Congress after the 2026 elections will likely not radically change Trump’s approach to Ukraine. The key variable is not the composition of Congress, but Moscow’s motivation and willingness to give Trump a “victory” that he can present to voters.
If by November 2026 Trump has nothing to show on the Ukrainian front – will this become a reason to exert pressure on Russia, or on the contrary, force any outcome for internal popularity?
