The Fury Fallen from the Sky: Strategic Analysis of the Aerial Campaign against Iran

The verdict of operations RL and EF remains suspended. Of the five declared objectives, regime change has failed; dismantling the nuclear program and ballistic capabilities are partial successes, with the issue of 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium buried under Isfahan still unresolved; the destruction of the Iranian navy has been substantially affected; dismantling the regional network of Iranian proxies has failed, with Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias remaining active after the ceasefire. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, an additional objective out of necessity, has not been achieved, with the barrel price remaining well above $100 a month after the ceasefire, compared to $70 before the war.

The implications for European air forces are direct and not based on the relevance of the Iranian theater to European interests. They stem from applying the parameters of RL and EF to the scenario of high-intensity conflict against Russia, in a context where American strategic depth can no longer be taken for granted.

Three key points emerge:

1. Inadequacy of European SEAD capabilities and ammunition stocks against a more potent Russian IADS; 2. Discrepancy of an order of magnitude between European inventories and consumption rates in 40 days of RL and EF; 3. Obsolescence of a model centered on a narrow range of advanced platforms, which must give way to a comprehensive set of capabilities, including stand-off and stand-in effectors, multi-layered air defense, persistent ISR, and an industrial base scaled to replenish stocks at the rate of their consumption.

No European air force currently possesses this, and no European coalition accumulates the required sum. The cost of this reconstruction will be significant. The cost of entering the next decade with an outdated model tailored for 1990s expeditionary operations would be even higher in light of RL and EF.