Water, a common good for humanity, lies at the heart of geopolitical and strategic rivalries in the Middle East. This region, marked by armed conflicts and political upheavals, makes water a central issue of power and vulnerability for states. Particularly exposed to water stress, they face several exacerbating factors such as climate change, population growth, and the degradation of hydraulic infrastructure. These dynamics fuel tensions and make water management an economic, social, and security challenge.
However, water geopolitics studies emphasize that there are rarely direct “water wars.” Water instead acts as a risk multiplier in latent conflicts. This perspective is confirmed by analyses of the Portal of Economic Intelligence on Central Asia, where access to water is described as a major power vector. This access is prone to fuel interstate or local tensions without being the sole cause.
In this context, Egypt and Israel offer contrasting trajectories. Egypt is heavily dependent on a transboundary river, the Nile, and its water security is undermined by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Israel, long plagued by a chronic water shortage, has turned water into a technological and geopolitical asset through desalination and wastewater reuse, while instrumentalizing this resource in the conflict with Palestinians. In both cases, water is now integrated into national security and is at the center of political discourse and strategic decisions.
Egypt: existential dependency on the Nile under tension
Structural vulnerabilities and rising water stress
Egypt relies on the Nile for over 90 to 98% of its freshwater resources. Egyptian officials regularly highlight this dependence as a matter of national survival. Studies on the country’s water resources management point to an alarming crisis, emphasizing the insufficient water resource per capita, pollution of irrigation canals, and delays in modernizing drinking water and sanitation networks.
This vulnerability is compounded by several structural dynamics. Population growth places the country below the thresholds of water availability per capita traditionally associated with water security. Furthermore, climate change is expected to reduce precipitation in the Nile basin and increase hydrological variability, worsening the risks of prolonged droughts. In addition to these, the progressive salinization of the delta and degradation of agricultural soils, amplified by potential flow reductions and intensive farming practices, add to the challenges.
The economic and social consequences of these tensions are already visible. A study on food subsidies highlights that the completion of the GERD, the war in Ukraine, and the reduced revenues from the Suez Canal constitute a major external shock. This contributes to a dual fragility in the country’s food security and Egyptian budgetary balances. A moderate reduction in Nile water inputs would intensify pressure on public finances and import dependence, risking fueling social unrest.
Israel: from chronic water scarcity to asymmetric hydro-power
Technological mastery that does not abolish geopolitics
On a regional scale, Israel stands out as an exception in water management. While many countries in the Middle East face water security fragility due to poor governance, underdeveloped or damaged infrastructure, Israel is often cited as a global water leader who has turned a structural weakness into a comparative advantage.
This success is built on three main pillars. Firstly, a massive effort in seawater desalination. According to several public policy analyses, around 70 to 75% of Israeli potable water now comes from large desalination plants on the Mediterranean coast, with several new installations under construction. Secondly, a policy of reusing wastewater without equal: nearly 90% of wastewater is treated and reused, mainly for irrigation, relieving pressure on aquifers and the Sea of Galilee. Lastly, investments in irrigation efficiency (drip irrigation, precise control of inputs) have strengthened a highly dependent agricultural sector.
However, the geopolitical dimension has not disappeared. Historically, the control of the Jordan River and aquifers has played a significant role in Israeli-Arab conflicts, with contested diversion projects and preventive strikes against hydraulic infrastructure in the 1960s. The conquest and maintenance of control over the Golan Heights, which feed the Jordan Basin, have also bolstered Israel’s long-term hydro-strategic position.
Today, Israel exercises a position of “hydro-hegemony” in the Jordan Basin, controlling the majority of resources and largely dictating the terms of sharing agreements, especially with Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. Several recent studies highlight that this asymmetry is complemented by using water as a negotiation tool, conditioning additional deliveries to Amman on energy or political agreements, as seen in the “Green Blue Deal” project exchanging Israeli desalinated water for Jordanian solar electricity.
Water as a vector of conflict against Palestinians
The Israeli-Palestinian territory is where water is most directly associated with conflict dynamics today. In the West Bank, Israel controls the majority of mountain aquifer and surface resources. This control is based on legal and military frameworks established post-1967, which subject the creation of new Palestinian infrastructure to rarely issued permits. Studies show significant consumption discrepancies, with Palestinians averaging around 70 to 80 liters per person per day, compared to 165 to 300 liters for an Israeli, depending on sources, significantly below World Health Organization recommendations for the former.
This structural asymmetry was exacerbated during the Gaza War in October 2023. Several reports document massive destruction of water and sanitation infrastructure. Satellite image analysis and field surveys indicate that more than half of Gaza’s hydraulic installations (wells, pumping stations, wastewater treatment plants) were damaged or destroyed in the early months of the conflict. Estimates by specialized NGOs suggest that by 2024, up to 80 to 85% of WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene) infrastructure was out of service or severely damaged, leading to a drastic reduction in water production compared to pre-war levels.
Conversely, Israeli authorities cut off and then restricted water supplies from Israel to the Palestinians. They also drastically reduced electricity and fuel deliveries necessary for pump and desalination plant operation, and limited the entry of essential repair materials. International organizations and NGOs, like Oxfam and Human Rights Watch, describe this strategy as the use of water as a “weapon of war,” attributing it to a significant increase in water-related disease, malnutrition, and dehydration.
Meanwhile, Palestinian agencies report that from early 2024, approximately 40% of Gaza’s water networks were destroyed, making access to safe and sustainable water challenging for the majority of the population. Other analyses suggest a reduction in available water per person to a few liters per day, significantly below international emergency standards, with a significant reliance on often inadequate and costly tanker deliveries.
Beyond the humanitarian urgency, this dynamic firmly embeds water in the realm of political and legal conflict. Recent studies on Israeli “hydro-hegemony” consider that resource and infrastructure control are integral to Israeli territorial and demographic control over Palestinians, in the West Bank and Gaza. Accusations of deliberate use of thirst as a weapon of war, echoed by UN experts, could weigh in international debates on war crimes. In the long term, they could influence how water security is integrated into international humanitarian law.
Conclusion
In the short term, the likelihood of a major armed conflict triggered solely by water remains unlikely, both in Egypt and Israel. However, the risks of destabilization associated with the resource are real. In the Egyptian case, the risk lies in securing a durable cooperation framework on the Nile and deeply modernizing internal water management to reduce the structural vulnerability of the economy and society. In the Israeli case, the focus is more on its use in the conflict with Palestinians and in regional relations. These practices can sustain enduring conflictuality with a strong political and humanitarian dimension.
Analyses from the Portal of Economic Intelligence on other regions show that water tensions often arise from a mix of ecological stress, population growth, and political rivalries. These factors foster complex crises. In the Middle East, several de-escalation mechanisms exist. Desalination is expanding, as are water-energy trade agreements and certain forms of water diplomacy. However, these solutions are insufficient without addressing access inequalities and perceptions of injustice in Egypt and Israel.
