Djilali Benchabane, geopolitical analyst and director of CEOS Strategy & Advice, was a guest on franceinfo. He discussed the implementation of a ceasefire in Lebanon, which has been weakened by reported violations, as well as the diplomatic balances between Israel, Lebanon, and the United States. He also analyzed the ongoing negotiations involving Iran, the role of Hezbollah in the region, and the political issues surrounding US President Donald Trump.
France Télévisions: A ceasefire came into effect last night at midnight precisely. It was officially announced yesterday by the Americans, but already violated according to Lebanon by the Israeli army. Can we truly speak of a ceasefire this morning?
Djilali Benchabane: Unfortunately, in this type of ceasefire, military operations can often continue on both sides. We are almost in a state of constant disruption, with the idea of a lingering tension. This tension is actually part of the negotiation process, but so far, the framework still holds. The goal is not to violate it. It should be noted that the American sponsor is working to maintain a level of credibility. There will probably be more clashes, but hopefully, the overall ceasefire will hold.
Does this mean that the tension does not affect the upcoming meeting in a few days in the United States between Donald Trump, the Lebanese president, and the Israeli prime minister?
In my opinion, not at this stage. It should be remembered that President Trump also has a question of credibility in his actions, including vis-à-vis his partners. Considering the criticism that has been leveled, particularly regarding the perception that the war between Iran and the US was influenced by Israel, a complete shift that would challenge the diplomatic framework could also have political consequences for President Trump.
Anthony Bellanger: What stands out immediately, observing the recently achieved ten-day ceasefire followed by serious and direct negotiations, is how similar this diplomatic effort is to the one obtained by the US and Iran in their conflict, or at least the ceasefire concluded on the other side, in the Strait of Hormuz. This coincidence or resemblance is likely not coincidental; it shows that the two conflicts are linked. This is what Iran was seeking, and what it has achieved. Can we then speak of a symbolic victory for Iran?
There may indeed be a symbolic victory for Iran, at least an integration of its parameters, and I also believe a form of pragmatism on the part of the United States, considering that the Lebanese issue could not be excluded from a comprehensive settlement. Looking at the entire complexity of the equation, it should be noted that the stabilization architecture in the Middle East also relies on integrating peripheral dimensions, particularly Lebanon and Hezbollah, as well as the Shiite proxies in Iraq to a lesser extent. In this sense, there is a level of seriousness: regardless of any disputes or attempts to sideline it, this dimension remains structurally essential.
The war between Hezbollah and Israel has always existed independently of the one between Israel and Iran. Can we truly envision a lasting peace, a historic peace, as Netanyahu claims?
I would be more cautious about the idea of a “historic peace.” It should be noted that negotiations are ongoing, but without the main actor: Hezbollah. And Hezbollah cannot be ignored, as it is both a military force, a social actor filling in some of the Lebanese state’s failures towards the Shiite community, and a major political player. Therefore, imagining peace without its integration, in my opinion, is utopian.
But is Hezbollah truly abandoned by Iran, as it also depends on Iranian decisions, and this was among the essential conditions set by Tehran to negotiate peace?
In my view, it is not abandoned. Evidence shows that the entire balance is being constructed in parallel with the negotiations between Tehran and Washington. In any diplomatic negotiation, there is always a symbolic aspect. Lebanon and Israel are engaged in discussions. Ultimately, the issue of Hezbollah will need to be reintegrated into the stabilization logic.
Anthony Bellanger: Yet, the question of Hezbollah’s “abandonment” is central to all these issues. This was evident when Lebanon agreed to negotiate for the first time in thirty years with Israel, regardless of Hezbollah’s opposition. This was also seen in the Iranian reaction to the expulsion of its ambassador from Beirut, seen as the beginning of a rupture between the Lebanese state and Iran, as well as between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah. Could Hezbollah ultimately become a secondary negotiation item between the US and Iran, helping to partially address the issue of its disarmament?
There are various levels of analysis on this subject. Negotiation could indeed proceed, in part or in whole, at the expense of Hezbollah. However, can we imagine that Iran would completely detach itself from it, especially since it is a crucial lever of its influence in the Middle East, particularly after the loss of Syria? I don’t think so. However, the issue of disarmament remains a central card. Again, I remain cautious, as the Lebanese state remains structurally fragile, which does not allow it in the short and medium term to challenge the influence and power of Hezbollah.
