Radar Coverage and Air Defense (O. Dujardin)

Conflicts in Ukraine and the Persian Gulf shed light on a tactical reality. Radar detection infrastructures, crucial for any air defense, are prime targets: fixed, visible, and within range of low-cost drones. This structural vulnerability requires a profound revision of doctrines for protecting airspace.

1. The structural vulnerability of radar sites Long-range surveillance radars and anti-ballistic detection systems have inherent operational characteristics. They are by nature fixed or minimally mobile installations. Their positioning results from precise topographic studies – peaks, clear plateaus, areas not masked by terrain or structures – optimizing electromagnetic coverage but imposing geographical constraints.

This physical constraint is compounded by their permanent electromagnetic signature during operation, and their visibility on satellite imagery. Equipment like the AN/FPS-132 (early warning radar), AN/TPY-2 (ballistic missile tracking radar), or AN/FPS-117 (air surveillance radar) have been located and targeted by Iranian forces without prior external intelligence, with Google Earth alone sufficient to identify their positions.

The same applies to Russian and Ukrainian radars. The attack on the Voronej-DM anti-ballistic radar near Armavir by a Ukrainian missile-carrying drone on May 23, 2024, perfectly illustrates this reality: a key strategic asset designed to protect Russian territory from intercontinental ballistic strikes was damaged by a relatively modestly designed device. The list of destroyed or damaged radars in both conflicts is now long and documented by numerous videos.

Another point: Fixity is not just geographical. It is also doctrinal; these systems were designed, deployed, and integrated into command architectures for conventional high-altitude threats, not for low-radar-signature drones flying at low altitudes.

2. Operational impact: the degradation of the aerial situation The destruction or neutralization of radar stations has an immediate and measurable consequence with a loss of control over the aerial situation in the affected sectors. In the context of Iranian strikes on American and Israeli infrastructures in the Gulf area, this degradation may have facilitated the penetration of certain missiles, detected later than expected.

The overall impact, however, was contained thanks to the presence of compensatory measures:

– AEGIS Cruisers: Equipped with AN/SPY-1 (or SPY-6 in the latest versions), these ships provide considerable onboard detection capability, are mobile, and difficult to neutralize in a first strike. – AWACS and E-2D Hawkeye radar aircraft: Additional aircraft have been deployed from the United States to address ground detection gaps. This reinforcement implicitly reflects the extent of losses in ground radars.

However, this compensation system has obvious structural limitations. Radar aircraft fleets are limited in number and subject to maintenance and crew rotation constraints incompatible with prolonged engagement. These airborne platforms are also vulnerable, as evidenced by the destruction of an American AWACS in Saudi Arabia. The American naval presence in the area is by definition temporary. In the medium term, the destruction of fixed ground radars will have a lasting impact on the detection capabilities of Gulf countries, without permanent solutions in place.

3. The silent revolution of missile-carrying drones: the end of strategic depth by distance For decades, strategic depth was measured in kilometers. A radar positioned 200 km behind the front was considered relatively protected: few conventional weapons could reach that distance, and those that could – cruise missiles, ballistic missiles – represented a significant financial and logistical investment, mechanically limiting the volume of possible strikes.

This equation has been fundamentally disrupted. A long-range, missile-carrying drone can now: – Travel hundreds to thousands of kilometers on a low-altitude trajectory, evading radar detection. – Strike ground targets with metric precision. – Cost between 15,000 and 30,000 euros per unit, compared to several million for a conventional cruise missile.

The cost/effect ratio is therefore radically asymmetric: an AN/TPY-2 radar represents an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars; the drone capable of neutralizing it costs less than 20,000 euros. This economic asymmetry fundamentally alters the logic of defensive investment and forces a reevaluation of the concept of strategic depth, which can no longer be defined solely by the distance from the front line.

(To be continued in the next part)